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MASTER AND SERVANT
OWNER'S LIABILrY To EMPLOYEE OF INDEPENDENT CON-
TRACToR-ELECTRICITY CASES-WHERE WORK IS INHER-
ENTLY DANGEROUS.
Defendant, an electric company, hired an independent contractor to
put in some tranformers at defendant's substation. Plaintiff, an employee
of the independent contractor, received injury from an electric shock
caused by the contact of an assembled steel tower, which plaintiff was
helping to guide, with the uninsulated high voltage wires on defendant's
property. Plaintiff was aware of and had been warned by defendant of
the dangers connected with the work. It is admitted that the independ-
ent contractor was negligent. Judgment for plaintiff in the trial court
was reversed and judgment entered for defendant, one judge dissent-
ing. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. O'Conner, et al., 50 Ohio
App. 30, 2 Ohio Op. 227, 19 Abs. 235 (Ohio Bar, Sept. 16, 1935).
The majority based their opinion on the theory that even though
there be inherent danger an owner is not liable to the employee of his
independent contractor even though under the same circumstances he
would be to a stranger. They stressed the facts that the employees knew
of the danger and that the defendant had warned the plaintiff thereof.
The dissent disagreed with this theory, saying: granted the duty con-
nected with inherent danger, then the owner is liable to any third party,
stranger or employee of an independent contractor.
The result of the majority view can be reconciled with cases in other
jurisdictions involving injury from the use of electricity. These cases
hold that the duty to an employee of an independent contractor is the
duty owed to an invitee. Dunn v. Cavanaugh, x85 Fed. 451, 107
C.C.A. 521 ('9"i); Pennsylvania Utilities Co. v. Brooks, 229 Fed.
93, 143 C.C.A. 369 (I916); Gagnon v. St. Maides Light & Power
Co., 26 Ida. 87, 141 P. 88 (914); Valparaiso Lighting Co. v. Tyler,
177 Ind. 278, 96 N.E. 768 (i9ii); Hoppe v. City of TViona, et al.,
113 Minn. 252, 129 N.W. 577, 33 L.R.A.N.S. 499, Am. Cas. I912
A, 247 (I911); Clark v. St. Louis & S. Ry. Co., 234 Mo. 396, 137
S.W. 583 ( 9I I); Sommer v. Public Sereice Corp. of N. J., 79 N.J.L.
349, 7 5 A - 892 (1910); Galveston-Houston Electric Ry. Co., et al. v.
Reinle, et al., ii 3 Tex. 456, 258 S.W. 803, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 777
(1924). Ohio, in a journal entry opinion in The Toledo & Indiana
Ry. Co. v. Baker, 4dmr., 8I Ohio St. 494, 91 N.E. 1141 (909)
seems to hold contra. It is generally held, however, that once the owner
has warned the empl6yee-not the independent contractor--of the
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danger, the employee assumes the risk. Dunn v. Cavanaugh, supra;
Clark v. St. Louis & S. Ry. Co., supra; Gagnon v. St. Maries Light &
Power Co., supra; Galveston-Houston Electric Ry. Co., et al. v. Reinle,
et al., supra.
It seems reasonable to apply to electricity cases this combination of
the theories of duty to invitee and assumption of risk. While electricity
is extremely dangerous, yet, it being confined spacially, does not have
the inherently dangerous qualities that other things have which are not
so confined and which the courts have called inherently dangerous, such
as blasting, Tiffin v. McCormick, 34 Ohio St. 638, 32 Am. Rep. 408
(1878), or pulling down an old wall, Covington & C. Bridge Co. v.
Steinbrock, 61 Ohio St. 215, 76 Am. St. Rep. 375, 55 N.E. 618, 7
Am. Neg. Rep. 154, affirming 4 O.N.P. 226, 6 Ohio Dec. (N.P.)
328 (1899).
But the court in the principal case decided that this work was inher-
ently dangerous and the contractor was negligent. Under such cir-
cumstances there is a non-delegable duty holding the owner liable to
third parties. Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Steinbrock, supra; Tiffin
v.McCormack, supra; Circleville v. Neuding, 41 Ohio St. 465 (1894);
Hughes v. Railway Co., 39 Ohio St. 461, affirming 7 Ohio Dec. Rep.
502, 3 Bull. 558 (1883); Railway Co. v. Morey, 47 Ohio St. 207, 24
N.E. 269, 7 L.R.A. 701 (i89o); Bower v. Peate, i L.R.Q.B. Div.
321 (1876); McCann v. Hodgate Co, 282 Mass. 584, 185 N.E. 483
(i933); Engel v. Eureka Club, 137 N.Y. 100, 32 N.E. 1052, 33
Am. St. Rep. 692 (1893). That "third party" includes the employee
of the independent contractor is the majority opinion of the decided cases.
Evans v. Dare Lumber Co., 174 N.C. 31, 93 S.E. 430 (1917); Wat-
son v. Black Mountain Ry. Co., 146 N.C. 176, 8o S.E. 175 (1913);
Black Mountain Ry Co., et al. v. Ocean iccident & Guarantee Corp.,
172 N.C. 636, 90 S.E. 763 (1916); Chicago Economic Fuel Gas Co.
v. Myers, x68 Ill. 139, 48 N.E. 66 (897); Mallory v. Louisiana
Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 6 S.W. (2d) 617 (1928);
contra, Peoria, Bloomington & Champaign Traction Co. v. O'Conner
149 Ill. App. 598 (19o9); see, Schip v. Pabst Brewing Co., 64 Minn.
22, 66 N.W. 3 (1896); Reilly v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 122
Iowa 525, 98 N.W. 464 (19o4); Salman v. Kansas City, 241 Mo.
14, 145 S.W. i6, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 328 (1912). One Ohio case on
the subject holds the owner liable to an employee of an independent con-
tractor where the machinery was dangerous unless the employee was told
how to operate it. Jacobs v. The Fuller & Hutsinpiller Co., 67 Ohio
St. 7o , 65 N.E. 617, 65 L.R.A. 833 and note (1902). The principal
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case distinguishes this case on the basis that in the Jacobs case the em-
ployee was not warned. This does not seem to be a valid distinction,
since liability where the owner is under a non-delegable duty is not
based upon the fact that the owner warned or did not warn an employee
but is based upon the contractor's negligence. Such negligence is ad-
mitted in the principal case.
It is probable that by weight of authority and by logic, the owner
should be liable to the employee of an independent contractor where
there is inherent danger. The employee is in no contractual relation
with the owner, Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., supra,
and at the same time is the one most likely to suffer injury. The con-
trary doctrine is based on the theory that such recovery would save the
independent contractor from the consequences of his own negligence.
Salmon v. Kansas City, supra. But this overlooks the reason behind the
doctrine of non-delegable duty where work is inherently dangerous.
The owner is held liable in order to make him hire responsible contrac-
tors for such dangerous undertakings. See note in 23 A.L.R. 1129
(1921). That the independent contractor is also liable for his negli-
gence under such circumstances see Warden v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co.,
123 Ohio St. 304, 175 N.E. 207 (1931).
It is thus concluded that while the majority in the principal case
reached the correct result in cases dealing with electricity they used the
wrong theory and, it would seem, incorrectly stated that an owner under




POWER OF COUNCIL OF NON-CHARTER CITY TO AMEND OR
REPEAL INITIATED ORDINANCES.
By virtue of an initiated ordinance adopted at the election on No-
vember 2, 1926, the people of Steubenville, Ohio, enacted legislation in
regard to the municipal fire department. The provisions of the ordinance
determined the number of the personnel of the department and also
fixed the salaries and compensation of the officers and members thereof.
Subsequently, the city council of Steubenville, which is a non-charter
municipality, enacted several ordinances materially affecting the wages
of the firemen and also the number of the members of the department.
The relators, members of the department, whose salaries had been re-
